Ignored Forced to Vote Again Eu Vote

On three occasions – Kingdom of denmark on the Maastricht Treaty, Ireland on the Overnice Treaty and Ireland over again on the Lisbon Treaty – voters have initially rejected an EU treaty only to vote in favour of information technology in a second referendum. Based on inquiry conducted in Denmark and Ireland, Ece Özlem Atikcan assesses the reasons why voters changed their minds in each case. She illustrates that 'Yes' campaigners in both states learned from previous referendums and developed an approach that reframed the issue by emphasising concessions gained from the EU and the risks of rejecting a treaty for a second time.

Reforming European Spousal relationship treaties is a complex process. For a new treaty to enter into force, all fellow member states need to ratify it and they are free to put the question to their electorates, with the system operation differently for different countries. While bigger fellow member states such as France tin – at least temporarily – put the brakes on the integration project when their public rejects a treaty, the smaller member states get back to their voters to persuade them in second referendums. This has happened three times in Eu referendums – in Denmark on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-3, Ireland on the Nice Treaty in 2001-2, and Ireland again on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008-9 – with all of these referendums ultimately proving successful for those backing the treaty. But why do voters change their mind in these repeat referendums?

Explaining the success of second European union referendums in Kingdom of denmark and Ireland

The reply lies in the specific dynamics of referendum campaigns. In a plebiscite, the typical No campaign strategy aimed at rejecting the treaty on offer is to associate the proposal with unpopular themes and thereby drive down public support for information technology. The No campaigners therefore have a structural advantage, as they need only to heighten doubts in the minds of voters. This state of play, withal, typically only holds for the kickoff plebiscite held on a treaty, not for the second. Drawing on face-to-face and semi-structured interviews with 38 campaigners in Kingdom of denmark and Ireland, I take performed an analysis of campaign documents which illustrates that campaign strategies were drastically different in the three '2d referendums' held by these countries.

In all three of the second referendums, the Yes campaigners used two new strategies to tie the hands of No campaigners. After the initial rejection, the authorities sought reassurances from the Eu on the controversial themes of the first campaign, effectively assuasive them to ask the same question over again. Having changed the context successfully, the Yep side could thereby frame the question differently. To accomplish this they used their second strategy, which was to enhance the stakes of a second rejection. This time the Yep side could use the risk factor, which was more than available to the No side in the first rounds. Importantly, Denmark initially designed these strategies, which the Irish learned and adopted later on.

Posters campaigning for a Yes and a NO vote in Ireland at the Lisbon Treaty referenda in 2008 (top row) and in 2009 (bottom). Photos: Ece Ozlem Atikcan

In the first rounds in both countries, as expected, the No entrada'south arguments tapped into the sensitive subjects relevant to society. In Denmark, the No side argued that the Maastricht Treaty would lead to loss of Danish sovereignty in a new United States of Europe, which would undermine or abolish the Danish currency and Danish citizenship. In Ireland during both the Nice and Lisbon referendums, the No campaigners repeatedly argued that the treaties would change Irish laws on abortion, atomic number 82 to a loss of sovereignty, undermine Ireland's armed forces neutrality, and remove its permanent European union Commissioner.

In the second circular, yet, the arguments changed. The Yes side argued that Europe had listened to the Danish/Irish people and responded with legal guarantees, which were specifically on the themes raised by the No side. With the Edinburgh Agreement, Kingdom of denmark would have iv opt-outs in the fields of European citizenship, economic and budgetary union, defence policy, and justice and home affairs. Ireland, on the other hand, gained guarantees concerning its military neutrality with the Seville Declaration afterward the Squeamish referendum, and on the Irish gaelic commissioner, competency over taxation rates, abortion, neutrality, and workers' rights later the Lisbon referendum.

In addition to the arguments on the guarantees, the Yes side emphasised the consequences of a second No vote such as potential exclusion from the EU and economic costs. This shift was visible in the choice of slogans equally well. In Denmark, the Liberal Party went from 'Vote Yes!' to 'Go for the safe choice, you will not go another chance'. In Ireland besides, abstract Yes slogans such as 'Europe: Let's be at the centre of information technology' were replaced with more dramatic messages such as 'Ruin versus recovery'.

Public stance data parallels these trends. To take the Irish gaelic Lisbon referendums as an example, Table 1 beneath shows that No campaigners succeeded in raising doubts on their themes in the first referendum. In the 2d referendum, however, the Yes side addressed the contention around these controversial No campaign themes, equally shown in Table 2, which confirms that a pregnant majority of voters agreed that the guarantees protected Irish interests.

Table ane: Agreement with No campaign themes in the first Lisbon Treaty referendum in Republic of ireland

Source: RedC Research

Table two: Perceptions of the guarantees provided to Ireland prior to the second Lisbon Treaty referendum

Source: Irish Department of Foreign Affairs

Individual-level data confirm these patterns, controlling for alternative explanations such as socioeconomic factors, party identification, level of knowledge, and attitudes towards the government and the Union. This multivariate regression analysis shows that sensation of guarantees on the Commissioner and taxation was associated with voting Yes. Every bit for the success of the second strategy, the aforementioned study confirms that the positive evaluation of Eu membership, and the expectation that the Aye vote would decrease Ireland'due south economic problems, were the key factors explaining the Yeah vote in 2009 likewise as the switch from a No vote in 2008 to a Yes vote in 2009.

Posters campaigning for a YES and a NO vote in Ireland at the Nice Treaty referenda in 2001 (height row) and in 2002 (lesser row). Photos: Ece Ozlem Atikcan

These findings show that the Yes campaigners learned from by experience and built a toolkit for overturning the negative result. In fact, at that place is show that the No side learned too. During the first Lisbon campaign, Irish gaelic No campaigners explicitly stressed that Ireland could become a better deal afterward a rejection by receiving concessions from the EU. This has implications, signalling a new course of negotiation ability for pocket-size fellow member states in guiding European integration.

Withal, as Yes campaigner Brendan Halligan put information technology: 'If Denmark wants to get out the EU, nobody is going to stop them, it is not a big deal. If Ireland wants to exit the European union, nobody is going to stop us, information technology is not a big bargain. Only if France votes No, that is that, there is no EU without France. As Orwell famously said, some are more than equal than others'. This implies that direct commonwealth does not office uniformly across the Wedlock. Depending on their size, member states need unlike strategies in using the referendum mechanism on European Marriage questions.

For a longer give-and-take of this topic, see the author'southward recent commodity in the Journal of Common Market Studies

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Note: This article gives the views of the writer, and non the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: William Tater / Flickr (CC BY-SA two.0)

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About the author

Ece Özlem Atikcan – Université Laval
Ece Özlem Atikcan is an Banana Professor at the Department of Political Scientific discipline, Université Laval in Québec. Her research seeks to explicate rapid shifts in public opinion towards the EU, focusing particularly on referendum campaigns. Her work has appeared in the Journal of Common Market place Studies, Journal of European Integration, has a forthcoming book published past Cambridge University Press.

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Source: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/10/19/asking-the-public-twice-why-do-voters-change-their-minds-in-second-referendums-on-eu-treaties/